2012

  • DP 12-01
    • D. Windisch
    • The Power to determine Accounting Regulation Effects of the EU’s Decision to delegate Standard Setting to a Private Body
  • DP 12-02
    • A. Oehler
    • T. Walker
    • S. Wendt
    • Effects of Election Results on Stock Price Performance: Evidence from 1976 to 2008
  • DP 12-03
    • M. Aichele
    • Forward Trading and Collusion of Firms in Volatile Markets
  • DP 12-04
    • A. Boisits
    • The Disciplining Role of Mandatory Disclosure
  • DP 12-05
    • B. Brandt
    • The Strategic Choice of Organizational Design with a Vertically Integrated Producer
  • DP 12-06
    • K. Brösamle
    • Misery as a stepping Stone: How and why Armed Conflicts and Natural Disasters accelerate Diplomats’ Careers
  • DP 12-07
    • H. Doluca
    • A Dynamic Model of Horizontal Mergers with Network Externalities
  • DP 12-08
    • O. Dürr
    • R. Göx
    • The Impact of a Bonus Regulation on Lending Volumes and Interest Rates in International Lending Markets
  • DP 12-09
    • M. Duran
    • Public Cheap Talk in Heterogeneous Boards
  • DP 12-10
    • G. Eisenkopf
    • U. Fischbacher
    • Doing well by doing good – or doing better by delegating?
  • DP 12-11
    • M. Erkens
    • Reporting Incentives and Enforcement: Impact on Corporate Risk Disclosure
  • DP 12-12
    • A. Czerny
    • F. Frank
    • P.-J. Jost
    • Multitask Tournaments – the Trade-off between one and two Tournaments
  • DP 12-13
    • B. Frick
    • The Hidden Costs of High Performance Work Practices: Evidence from a Large German Steel Company
  • DP 12-14
    • R. Göx
    • Say on Pay Design, Executive Pay, and Board Dependence
  • DP 12-15
    • J. Grathwohl
    • D. Simons
    • External Auditors using the Work of Internal Auditors – A game theoretic Analysis
  • DP 12-16
    • C. Grund
    • J. Martin
    • Monetary Reference Points of Managers
  • DP 12-17
    • H. Hakenes
    • I. Schnabel
    • Regulatory Capture by Sophistication
  • DP 12-18
    • D. Halbheer
    • F. Stahl
    • O. Koenigsberg
    • D. Lehmann
    • Sampling Strategies for Information Goods
  • DP 12-19
    • S. Dikolli
    • C. Hofmann
    • T. Pfeiffer
    • Accounting for Net Performance in Managerial Compensation Contracts
  • DP 12-20
    • C. Hopp
    • A. Minten
    • N. Toporova
    • Stepping Stones and Vicious Circles: Signaling, Screening, and Transition into Permanent Employment through Temporary Work
  • DP 12-21
    • J. Joecks
    • K. Pull
    • K. Vetter
    • Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass”
  • DP 12-22
    • R. Kirstein
    • S. Koné
    • Corporate Raiders, Incumbent Blockholders, and Voting Caps. A Power-Index Analysis of the Old VW Law
  • DP 12-23
    • J. Koenen
    • I. Ruhmer
    • Complementary Inputs and the Incentives for Upstream Firms to patent and innovate
  • DP 12-24
    • M. Crummenerl
    • T. Doll
    • C. Koziol
    • How to Pay Envious Managers – A Theoretical Analysis
  • DP 12-25
    • J. Kragl
    • Relational Incentive Contracts for Envious Workers
  • DP 12-26
    • E. Dockner
    • C. Löffler
    • Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior
  • DP 12-27
    • H. Jahnke
    • J. Martini
    • A. Peterwerth
    • Does a Buyer benefit from acquiring Information for his Supplier?
  • DP 12-28
    • P. Beltz
    • S. Link
    • A. Ostermaier
    • Incentives for Students: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments
  • DP 12-29
    • S. Pohlmann
    • Strategic Priorities and the Use of Subjectivity in Incentive Contracts
  • DP 12-30
    • W. Schnedler
    • Incentive Design and Distorted Behavior
  • DP 12-31
    • C. Lambert
    • F. Noth
    • U. Schüwer
    • How do Banks react to increased Asset Risks? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina
  • DP 12-32
    • P.-J. Jost
    • M. Zschoche
    • Efficient Organization of Dynamic Capabilities: Exploiting Complementarities by Organizational Bundling
  • DP 12-33
    • P. Kampkötter
    • Determinants of Compensation in the Financial Services Industry
  • DP 12-34
    • P.-J. Jost
    • The Ball is round, the Game lasts 90 Minutes, Everything else is Pure Theory
  • DP 12-35
    • K. Breuer
    • P. Kampkötter
    • Do Employees Reciprocate to Intra-Firm Trainings? An Analysis of Absenteeism and Turnover Rates
  • DP 12-36
    • M. Kräkel
    • D. Müller
    • Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective