2000

  • DP-00-01
    • U. Schweizer
    • An Elementary Approach to the Hold-Up Problem with Renegotiation
  • DP 00-02
    • M. Haas
    • Earnings management in two-periode principal-agent models
  • DP 00-03
    • C. Laux
    • Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management
  • DP 00-04
    • U. Kaiser
    • Research cooperation and research expenditures with endogenous absorptive capacity
  • DP 00-05
    • H. Dawid
    • M. Kopel
    • Commitment and Contract Design Under Common Uncertainty and Additional Information Signals
  • DP 00-06
    • S. Rosenkranz
    • To reveal or not to reveal – The case of research joint ventures with two-sided incomplete information
  • DP 00-07
    • M. Mantrala
    • M. Krafft
    • B. Weitz
    • An empirical examination of economic rationales for companies‘ use of sales contests
  • DP 00-08
    • J. Bigus
    • Creditor Conflicts prior to Bankruptcy and Credit Rationing